Dan T. Matrafajlo Case Results & Legal Precedent
Dan T. Matrafajlo, Esq. has established or aided in the establishment of various legal precedent that have been published in New Jersey based legal periodicals. Some of the legal precedent established by Mr. Matrafajlo are as follows:
Hardison v. King, 381 N.J.Super. 129, 137-38 (App.Div.2005)
An Appellate Division case that arose out of an appeal of a trial court’s decision granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. In other words, the trial court Judge felt the law prevented Mr. Hardison from seeking monetary damages for his injuries since he had three prior injuries to the same body parts. In disagreement with the Judges determination an Appeal was filed. At the Appellate Division, which comprises of a three-Judge panel, the Court reversed the trial court’s finding which created a narrow exception to the then existing law.
The Appellate Division held that the plaintiff had established a genuine issue of fact relating to whether his injuries were permanent and caused by the subject automobile accident. The Court further held that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether rear-ended driver’s disc herniations were caused solely by the automobile accident, as his treating physicians reported, precluding summary judgment in driver’s negligence action; although rear-ended driver suffered injuries to the same body parts in previous automobile accidents , the prior accidents were nine and ten years prior, and the injuries were minor, completely resolved, and asymptomatic at the time of the accident at issue.
Frenklakh v. Lojek, (Westlaw citation: 2007 WL 470640)
Dan T. Matrafajlo argued for the plaintiff. In that case, Plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident on June 29, 2002 in Verona, New Jersey and allegedly suffered injuries to his spine and right knee as a result.
The motion judge concluded that plaintiff’s claimed injuries to his spine were an aggravation of prior injuries suffered in an earlier motor vehicle accident in 1995. As such, the motion judge in Superior Court, Law Division, Essex County, New Jersey entered Summary Judgment against plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed.
On appeal the Appellate Division reversed the trial court Order entering Summary Judgment and held that: (1) plaintiff was required to present expert comparative medical analysis; (2) the expert comparative medical analysis report regarding plaintiff’s back injuries was competent summary judgment evidence; and (3) a triable issue existed as to whether plaintiff’s knee injury was permanent under the No-Fault Act.
In re P.A.F., 176 N.J. 218, 822 A.2d 572, N.J., May 08, 2003 (NO. A-18 SEPT.TERM2002)
After petitioner pled guilty and served his sentence for aiding and abetting official misconduct and other crimes, he filed a verified petition which sought expungement of his record of conviction. The Superior Court, Law Division, originally expunged petitioner’s criminal record and then on reconsideration rescinded his previous order and denied the expungement petition.
Petitioner appealed. The Superior Court, Appellate Division, affirmed. Petitioner appealed. The Supreme Court, Albin, J., held that statute which prohibited expungement of crimes committed by a person holding public office did not prohibit expungement of the criminal record of a private citizen who had been convicted of aiding and abetting a public office holder in the commission of their crimes.*
State v. Pinter, Appellate Division 2011 (case citation omitted until provided a citation reference by Westlaw)
My client, Matt Pinter, was stopped by an East Brunswick police officer on his way home from a local bar. The issue on appeal was whether the East Brunswick police officer had probable cause to stop my client. A probable cause hearing was held at the East Brunswick municipal Court before Judge Christine Heitmann.
During the hearing but more particularly during cross-examination, the East Brunswick officer did equivocate and admit that Mr. Pinter was not necessarily recklessly driving or delaying traffic. The police officer further admitted on cross-examination that he was unaware of the paragraph in New Jersey’s speeding law (39:4-98) that a motorist is required to reduce his/her speed in inclement weather.
Judge Christine Heitmann opined that the officer had probable cause based on the legal doctrine known as Community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. The municipal court judge felt that even if a moving violation was not necessarily committed by Mr. Pinter the officer had the requisite probable cause to conduct a motor vehicle stop based the aforementioned doctrine.
Defendant Appealed to the Law Division then to the Appellate Division which affirmed the motor vehicle stop but all on different grounds. The Law Division Judge felt that there was a motor vehicle violation that was committed by Mr. Pinter however, the judge failed to specify what motor vehicle law had been breached. As opposed to the Appellate Division which relied on criminal law, as opposed to, motor vehicle law to uphold the stop. My opinion was that each Judge was anti-DWI because this particular defendant’s BAC level was particularly high-nearly three times the legal limit.
Dan T. Matrafajlo role in that particular New Jersey Supreme Court case was limited to drafting the briefs and pleadings because at that time he was not yet certified by the Supreme Court of New Jersey to practice law however, his efforts proved successful based on the fact that the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in his favor without even hearing conducting a formal hearing.
Frank P. Beninato, Jr was involved in some important Appellate Decisions. A decision to note is the Perreira opinion rendered by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
Perreira v. Rediger 169 N.J. 399, 778 A.2d, 429 (2001).
The Supreme Court held that: (1) the statutory collateral source rule prohibits health insurers from recovering subrogation or reimbursement out of a tort judgment or settlement in favor of their insureds; (2) Insurance Commissioner’s regulations authorizing subrogation and reimbursement provisions in health insurance contracts are limited to cases in which the statutory collateral source rule does not apply; and (3) the health insurer had no contractual right to reimbursement.>